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Abstract: The paper investigates actions and decisions of agricultural resource users and explores
their implications for institutional change and natural resource management in the post-socialist
context of Central Asia. More specifically, the authors propose a novel methodological approach for
the aforementioned context to support policy-relevant research that explicitly addresses behavioral
responses of pastoralists in Kyrgyzstan. The paper builds on distributive and economic theories
of institutional change and combines findings from lab and field framed economic experiments
with complementary qualitative methods (questionnaires, group discussions and semi-structured
interviews). By these means the authors test the impact of a specific variable on institutional
change in pasture use: the role of power and specifically the difference in the ability of players
to “survive” in a bargaining game without an agreement. The impact of power asymmetries and its
implications for cooperation and the efficiency of bargaining outcomes are discussed and analyzed.
Experimental results largely confirm findings reported in the literature: as players learn about the
game and the behavior of others, they adjust their decisions accordingly; the subjects also exhibit
other-regarding preferences, resulting to the prevalence of relatively equally distributed gains as
an outcome. Furthermore, the findings of the study suggest that under the condition of incomplete
information about the preferences of other players, the experimental subjects internalize the game
as a group. The authors propose that an explanatory variable for such situations might be that
actual shared beliefs of pasture users assist players to economize on information processing and
coordinate the bargaining in an effective way. From this perspective, the paper raises a series of
questions regarding the proposition that power asymmetry leads to inefficient bargaining outcomes,
and provides some first insights for further investigation.
Keywords: institutions; bargaining power; efficiency of bargaining outcome; laboratory and field
experiment; pasture management; Kyrgyzstan
1. Introduction
Intended institutional change, implies the deliberate replacement of existing, formal or informal
institutions, or the creation of new institutions with the aim of changing de facto institutions by
regularizing actors’ interactions [1]. Changes in institutions following institutional design can emerge
as an outcome of changed perceptions about roles, identities, normative values, cognitive frames
and rules in a particular context. It has been argued however that outcomes of institutional design
can be essentially unpredictable, largely depending on the specificities of the problem situation and
the way in which experience, expert knowledge or intuition are applied [1]. A variety of theories
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of institutional change have been proposed, but wishing to keep our account short, we focus on
distributive and economic theories of institutional change that offer alternative, yet complementary in
our view, interpretations of the main drivers for such change.
Economic theory views institutional change primarily as the result of contracting between
economic actors, whereas distributive bargaining theory perceives institutions to be equilibriums
achieved through bargaining outcomes. The “naive” version of such an economic approach assumes
that institutional change is the result of opportunities for Pareto improvements which arise because
of price changes or new production and monitoring technologies [2]. The advanced version,
however, includes transaction costs in the analysis and assumes that bargaining and transaction
costs may block the establishment of efficient institutions [3]. In this respect, power and efficiency
considerations of actors are suggested as alternative determinants of institutional change. However,
due to the complexity of institutional change, actors—who intentionally make decisions concerning
new institutions based on their beliefs about the potential benefits offered by different institutional
forms—may be disappointed by its unintended consequences. This might contribute to difficulties
in distinguishing the predictions of economic and distributional theories. Jack Knight and Douglass
North [4] underline that economic and distributional theories share common assumptions about the
motivations of actors but are different in their claims about the context in which they make their
choices. They argue that both theories can be complementary, depending on the set of conditions
within which interactions and institutional change are occurring.
The aim of this paper is to explore how power asymmetry as a vital condition in the context
of rural Kyrgyzstan, can affect the outcomes of interactions (efficiency). In order to investigate this
relationship we conducted framed laboratory and field bargaining experiments based on Rubinstein’s
bargaining game [5]. Our motivation is to advance the understanding of the individual preferences
and bargaining strategies of pasture users. Our findings contribute to the rich literature comparing
decisions between students and resource users in experimental games [6–9]. Although, this is a
well explored field, no such comparison has been made for the Rubinstein’s game, at least to our
knowledge. The experimental results have been complemented by additional qualitative findings
(from questionnaires, group discussions and interviews) to advance our understanding and enhance
the analysis of the given socio-ecological pastoral context in which bargaining takes place.
The paper is structured as follows: First, we briefly introduce the institutional context in pasture
management in Kyrgyzstan and provide an illustrative bargaining situation (Section 2). In the following
we present Knight’s and Oliver Williamson’s positions on the role of power and efficiency in social
interactions according to bargaining theory (Section 3). Here we also describe the design of the pasture
experiment and we outline the complementary methods used in the study. In the following Section 4,
we present the findings from laboratory and field experiments carried out in Kyrgyzstan. In this
section, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and contingency coefficient tests in order to measure the
deviation between two sets of sample values in the symmetric and asymmetric treatments. In Section 5
we discuss the relation between the demands of players and the bargaining outcomes. The qualitative
data acquired complement the analysis by explaining the difference between laboratory and field
experimental results. Finally, in the concluding Section 6 we reflect on our findings concerning the
role of power, efficiency and shared actor beliefs during bargaining interactions related to pasture use
in Kyrgyzstan.
2. Institutional Context in Pasture Management in Kyrgyzstan
Since the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan has undergone a change from a centralized state-managed
economy to a decentralized market-oriented economy and, in the process, gained valuable experience
in designing new institutions in pasture management.
This period of change in Kyrgyzstan and other former Soviet states triggered the emergence of
an academic discourse on how the post-socialist transition, transformation and institutional change
should be conceptualized. There has been a shift in the understanding of the nature of the transition
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process: from support of “blueprint” top-down approaches to designing a post-socialist transition
to a critical analysis of bottom-up transformation and institutional change. The transformation
context has been perceived as an experimental laboratory, where actors develop and try out new
organizational forms and institutional arrangements [10,11]. In many cases, path dependence and
institutional complementarities with informal institutions have played key roles in the transformation
process [12–14].
Seen in this light, post-socialist institutional change has been characterized by: (i) the livelihood,
institutional and ecological uncertainties that have resulted from radical agricultural reforms; (ii) path
dependence and persistence of traditional and Soviet institutions; and (iii) discrepancy and complex
interplay between law and social organization, informal and formal institutions. It is also assumed
that (iv) conflicts, bargaining and power relationships among actors shape institutional change.
In pasture management, there is great consensus among scholars today that sustainable pasture
use and management in Central Asia depends largely on pastoral migration [15–18]. However,
the early post-Soviet pasture management reforms in Kyrgyzstan did not recognize the importance of
institutions coordinating pastoral migration and did not take into account the economic and political
dynamics related to mobile herding [19,20]. These early reforms resulted in a massive reduction
in pastoral mobility leading to the overgrazing of pastures, decreasing livestock productivity and
increasing conflicts between pasture users over access to the resource. The consequences of such change
could be grave for a country where the economy is primary agricultural and 65% of its population
lives in rural areas.
Furthermore, under the conditions of uncertainty and legal pluralism marking this period—with
many institutional levels coexisting in an uneasy and often contradictory state—pasture users began
referring to different old and new rules, both formal and informal, to pursue their interests, relying on
their power in different situations to advance them [13]. As a result of this transformation, traditional
institutions and practices started adapting to the new realities and many new informal institutional
arrangements were developed [13,21]. In the following we provide an illustrative example that the
authors observed and largely informed consecutive research phases.
Illustrative Bargaining Situation between Community Herders and Livestock Owners Leading to Creation of a
New Informal Institution
In this illustrative action situation, a livestock owner (actor A) and a community herder (actor B)
bargain over the price, place, and terms and conditions of herding (Figure 1). Similar to Rubinstein’s [5]
bargaining model, this is a dynamic form of bargaining interaction, with sequential exchange of offers
and counteroffers:
The livestock owner approaches the community herder, making a payment offer for his herding
service. The community herder may accept this offer, or refuses and makes a counteroffer instead.
If there is no agreement reached, it is assumed that the livestock owner must take care of the
livestock himself, as another suitable price or another herder is not found.
If the community herder accepts the price offer of the livestock owner, they then begin to negotiate
the herding plan (when and to which pastures the community herder will move livestock this year) and
other conditions of the cooperation (e.g., advance payments and in-kind help during labor-intensive periods).
An experienced herder may obtain a better price even if he stays on spring and autumn pastures
whereas an inexperienced herder may agree to move to remote summer pastures, despite a lower
price offer.
There are two possible equilibrium outcomes for the second part of their negotiations, when they
decide to cooperate: (i) the community herder moves with the collected livestock to distant spring,
summer and autumn pastures or (ii) the herder stays on spring and autumn pastures close to the village
and market, without moving to distant summer pastures. We assume that the main goal of the pasture
users is to achieve a distributional advantage, which depends on the specific outcome equilibrium that
is attained and the implications for either party. The livestock owner gains a distributional advantage
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if the community herder moves to spring, summer and autumn pastures. In this case, his livestock is
likely to gain more weight as more feed will be available, and the livestock will consequently have
a higher value. In contrast, the strategy of staying on spring and autumn pastures close to village
and market, without moving to summer pasture, has a distributional advantage for the herder, as he
can sell livestock products at the local market and have smaller transportation costs. In a case of
non-cooperation, herder and livestock owner need to take care of their livestock themselves, but in
this bargaining situation payoffs (breakdown values) are lower than payoffs for cases of cooperation.
The social dilemma we are concerned with emerges when the community herder selects the
strategy of staying on pastures without seasonal rotation, leading to overgrazing, degradation and
decrease of pasture productivity. Here, community herders would be in a stronger bargaining position
than livestock owners.
This bargaining outcome was observed in both communities investigated empirically at an early
stage of this study: winter pastures and most accessible spring and autumn pastures are overgrazed,
as herders use them throughout the whole year without rotation; meanwhile, the most distant summer
pastures are underused. This outcome is essentially a new informal institution, created through the
way actors have bargained in this action situation.
Bargaining positions in this action situation depend, to a large degree, on how credible livestock
owners find the commitment of community herders. This is the key to the relative bargaining power
community herders have in this bargaining situation. The credibility of the commitment of community
herders depends on their professional reputations. The commitment of inexperienced young herders
without their own livestock may not be credible to livestock owners, as the risks associated with
herding require a certain amount of knowledge and experience, which are key assets in pasture use.
In making their decisions, herders take into account many ecological factors of the pastoral system and
must know quite a bit about the complex dynamics between vegetation cover, stocking densities and
other environmental aspects [13,22] (p. 69). This interaction between herders and owners is repeated
every year, and livestock owners will hardly entrust their livestock to the community herders who
have not cared well for their livestock in a previous year. These observations motivated the authors to
investigate the role of power in the bargaining situations regarding pasture use as a vital condition
affecting the efficiency of the outcomes of such interactions.
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3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Power or Efficiency?
Knight [23,24] suggests that economic contract and distributive bargaining approaches to
interpreting institutional change, model basic social interactions differently. Thereby Knight offers
alternative explanations of change by referring to different sets of conditions. The mainstream economic
approaches are based on examining interaction situations where cooperation payoffs are higher than
breakdown values, where breakdown values are equal. The bargaining approach on the other hand,
emphasizes the differences in both player payoff structures and breakdown values. Knight argues that,
unlike the efficiency concept, the distributive theory of institutional change seeks to explain rational
self-interested behavior in a broader range of conditions in which social interaction takes place.
Williamson [25] insists however, that efficiency is also an important explanatory variable under
conditions of asymmetric interaction: “power has little to contribute to the study of contract and
organization in circumstances where parties to an exchange can and do contract in a relatively
farsighted way” [25] (p. 23). He argues that asymmetric interaction may have an efficient constructional
arrangement, and underlines an important condition: the actors involved in such interaction tend to
look toward the future, recognizing potential hazards and transaction costs prior to their agreement.
Thus, in order to protect their interests, the actors choose what appear to be the most efficient
agreements, which include safeguards.
In order to explore the relationship between sets of conditions (related to power asymmetry)
and the outcomes of interactions (explicitly referring to efficiency) we have conducted a study of
bargaining interactions based on Rubinstein’s bargaining game [5]. In what follows, we present the
bargaining game model and we position it in relation to the experimental literature regarding the
interplay between power and efficiency.
3.2. Rubinstein’s Bargaining Game and Experimental Evidence
Rubinstein [5] (p. 97) defines the bargaining problem by setting the following situation and
question: “Two individuals have before them several possible contractual agreements. Both have interests
in reaching agreement, but their interests are not entirely identical. What will be the agreed contract,
assuming that both parties behave rationally?” He proposes a formal solution to the bargaining
problem: The higher a player’s bargaining power, the larger the share he or she will obtain in
the outcome. Under the necessary condition of complete information, Rubinstein predicts that an
agreement can be reached in the most efficient way if:
1. The first offer is accepted and
2. There are no inefficiency-inducing delays, no matter how much power players have.
In line with this bargaining-game theory prediction, experimental evidence has indicated a high
percentage of efficient agreements in bargaining experiments. However, the literature reports that a
non-negligible amount of offers have not been accepted immediately, leading to decreases in bargaining
efficiency [26–28].
The implications of power asymmetry for equity and efficiency are further explored in the public
good and common pool games in Kyrgyzstan [29] and elsewhere [30,31] it has been found that
player payoffs significantly decrease when one of the players has asymmetric power and “there is a
fundamental balance between inequality and efficiency” [31] (p. 1596). Experimental literature offers
some possible explanations for this observation:
• Subjects learn about the game and the behavior of other players, adjusting their behavior accordingly.
Bargainers are not only concerned about their own payoffs but for the earning of their fellow
co-players. Consequently there is a prevalence of equal divisions in experiments [27] (p. 327).
• The differences of players between the expectations about the terms of a potential agreement and
a failure to reach one influence their behavior [26].
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• Power asymmetry does not exclude cooperation, however it might hinder it. This occurrence is
related to the degree of “inequality” disadvantaged players are willing to tolerate [31].
In order to explore how power asymmetry can affect the efficiency of bargaining outcomes,
we conducted framed laboratory and field experiments dealing with the use of pasture in Kyrgyzstan.
The selection of the particular case allowed us to explore the relationship between power asymmetry
and efficiency in a setting where users regularly face bargaining dilemmas related to the use of this
vital resource. The laboratory experiments were carried out in Naryn State University in Naryn and
the initial intention of the authors was to test the game, recruit and train field assistants and to use
students as control group. However, as it will be later discussed the experimental findings from the
students offered further insights. The field experiments were conducted in Jergetal and Tosh Bulak
communities (Jergetal Ayil Okrugu, Naryn rayon, Naryn Oblast) and Tosh Bulak (Tosh Bulak Ayil
Okrugu, Sokuluk rayon, Chui oblast) (see Figure 2), representative cases of the different environmental
and socio-economic characteristics of two typical regions of Kyrgyzstan. While Jergetal is located in a
remote mountain region with harsh climate conditions, with a traditional specialization in livestock
and limited economic alternatives, Tosh Bulak has characteristics of a peri-urban area with a mild
climate, good access to market and developed infrastructure. Compared with Tosh Bulak, Jergetal has
a larger total area of pastures for climatic and topographic reasons. Due to the scarcity of pasture areas,
the pressures on the resources are much higher in the Tosh Bulak. Despite their different characteristics,
the selected communities face similar problems of pasture use, for instance, livestock has increased
significantly in recent years in both communities affecting pasture conditions.
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with experiment participants. In the following we describe the design of the game and the applied
complementary methods.
3.3. Experimental Design
Rubinstein’s bargaining game [5] was chosen as the basis for our experiment. According to
bargaining game theory, the credibility of commitment is key to relative bargaining power, as the logic
of institutionalization is to constrain the choices of others through one’s own credible commitments.
Awareness of differences of social actors in their payoffs for non-coordination (breakdown values) can
influence the credibility of strategies. The mechanism of bargaining is illustrated with the following
example: Let us assume that player A communicates to player B that he will choose strategy (R),
which provides greater benefit to him, regardless of the choice of player B; we can expect that, if he
finds the commitment of player A to be credible, player B will select strategy (L), even if it is less
beneficial for him. The credibility of commitment depends on the difference of the breakdown values
of players, and the availability of exit costs, exit opportunities of non-coordination and time preferences
(favoring early rather than delayed coordination) which can all affect actor’s choices. Player B accepts
the credibility of commitment of player A, if she knows that player A is likely to suffer less in a case
of non-cooperation. In Rubinstein’s bargaining game bargaining power is the ability of a player to
survive without an agreement; thus, bargaining power time preference (or patience of the players
involved) is modeled using discount factors. For example, there are two players bargaining over the
partition of a pie of size L. Each makes a proposal regarding how the pie should be divided between
them. Each player has a discount factor d1 or d2. The discount factor (di) has to be less than 1 and
at least one of them has to be positive (0 < di > 1). If d2 = 0, that means that pie has no worth for
Player 2 after the first round, and Player 1 can exploit this to get all the pie. If d1 = 0, Player 1 gains
1 − d2, which is the proportion of the pie that Player 2 loses, if he refuses an offer from Player 1 in the
first round.
In cases where offers are rejected, the pie decreases for each player differently, according to her or
his discount factor. The stronger a player is, the higher their share will be. Bargaining game theory
predicts that
1. In the first round, player 1 offers (1 − d2)/(1 − d1d2) for himself and 1 − (1 − d2)/(1 − d1d2) for
player 2.
2. Player 2 will immediately accept this offer.
For each run of the experiment, each of the players was randomly selected to be either the young
community herder or livestock owner. In this game, the livestock owner and young community
herder are to share 100 KGS (Exchange rates are based on http://www.nbkr.kg, on 1 August 2013,
the exchange rate was 48.90 KGS to the USD; on 1 May 2014, it was 53.90 KGS to the USD). In first
round, the livestock owner starts and writes on a piece of paper an offer to share this amount in (%)
to the herder. The young community herder may accept or reject the offer. If the herder accepts, the
game is over and the agreed amount is shared between the players. But, if the herder rejects the offer,
then the next round begins. The new amount to share however is decreased and now differentiates
for each player (see Table 1). The higher a player’s discount factor is, the higher her bargaining
power. The participant who plays first (in this game the livestock owner) has an additional positional
advantage as well.
In the symmetric treatment, the amount to share decreases by 40% for the livestock owner
(first mover) and by 30% for the young community herder (second mover). The discount factor
is higher for the livestock owner. This difference illustrates the fact that the first mover has more
bargaining power than the second mover. Meanwhile, in the asymmetric treatment, the amount
to share decreases by 5% for the livestock owner and by 30% for the community herder (Table 1).
The chosen discount factors were selected following Vollstädt [28] in order to keep calculations
simple while differentiating enough between players and treatment types. We tried to adjust the
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discount factors of livestock owners and herders in order to reflect their power relation in practice.
This adjustment was informed by qualitative research preceding the experiment, which was more of
an informed assumption or a vague estimation rather than an actual measurement.
The laboratory experiment was conducted at the Naryn State University in Naryn, Kyrgyzstan in
May 2013. Twenty undergraduate students from the economics and environmental departments
were invited to participate in the game. Subsequently, the field experiments were conducted
with forty pasture users in the Jergetal and Tosh Bulak communities in June–July 2013 and in
May 2014 respectively. Undergraduate students (50% female) from the economics and environmental
departments were invited to participate in the game, of which 20 students with an average age of
21 participated in both symmetric and asymmetric treatments. About 30% of participants were from
households living in a rural area. The field experiments were conducted in the Jergetal and Tosh
Bulak communities with 40 pastoralists with an average age of 37 taking part in both symmetric and
asymmetric treatments. About 40% of the participants were female and 82% had at least a secondary
education. Half of the participants were medium livestock owners and 30% were community herders.
In both experiments, the majority of participants reported that they understood the game (93% in field
and 70% in the laboratory) and were satisfied with the money they earned (87% in field and 95% in
the laboratory).
Table 1. Symmetric and asymmetric treatments.





Symmetric 0.60 0.70 (0.52; 0.48) 1 round
Asymmetric 0.95 0.70 (0.90; 0.10) 1 round
Source: Adapted from Vollstädt [28].
3.3.1. Experimental Procedure
The authors, together with local research assistants visited the university and rural communities
before the actual experiment in order to discuss the selection criteria for the players, a realistic number
of participants, acquires some background data, find a venue and deal with organizational issues.
We opted not to invite subjects with previous experience on economic experiments, ruling out possible
learning effects and biases from other ongoing or past similar activities [29]. Participants for the
experiment were finally recruited via local partners: members of the Pasture Committees within the
selected communities and staff from the Department of Ecology at Naryn State University.
Before the game, the participants signed consent letters and randomly selected their ID numbers.
In the following, they assumed the role of either livestock owner or young herder and 30 bargaining
pairs were formed in total (10 pairs of students and 20 of pasture users). Instructions in the local
language were distributed and players had time to read them and to ask questions. During the
introductory sessions (asymmetric and symmetric) the participants were informed about the discount
rates of the bargaining pair. Please note that prior to and during the experiment we did not explain
power and why bargaining pairs have different discount rates. During the focus group discussion
after the experiment though, we discussed extensively what discount rates means for the power of
pasture users and how the bargaining outcome of the game relates to real-life situations. During
the experiment, players were not allowed to communicate; bargaining pairs were placed in separate
rooms or places so as to ensure sufficient privacy. The players’ decisions were written on a previously
prepared paper distributed to the players just before the beginning of the game. After the experiment,
each participant filled out a questionnaire. At the end of all games, a focus group discussion followed
and in depth interviews with all players were conducted. As a very last step, participants were
paid according to their earnings from the game in cash and in private, receiving also a show-up fee.
On average, each player earned the equivalent of one day’s wages for their local area for his or her
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participation in a 2.5 to 3 h session. The moderators did not limit the time for the bargaining in
each round, but the experiments lasted a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 4 rounds. Each of the
60 individuals that took part in the experiment received an average of 285 KGS (6 USD), including
their earnings and the show-up fee.
3.3.2. Complementary Methods
Before and after the field experiments, in total 40 qualitative semi-structured interviews were
conducted with pasture users in the studied communities within a framework of qualitative case study.
Two communities, were chosen for the case study, identified as administrative units (Aiyl Okrugu).
The units of analysis were core bargaining situations in which actors make decisions that tend to have
strong impacts on shaping the outcome of social dilemmas in pasture use and management. The case
study was undertaken as a means to investigate formal as well as informal mostly undocumented
institutions for regulating pasture use. The acquired knowledge was deemed necessary in order
to analyze the causes and reasons for actors’ decisions as well as to better understand and explain
ongoing change of pastoral institutions.
Inputs from these in-depth interviews provided important information for framing the experiment
and also for equipping the researchers with qualitative information that would prepare them for
the games and enable them to understand possible reasons and motivations for decisions made
by the pasture users. The post-experimental survey acquired some additional information on
players’ demographics, current pasture practices and reasoning behind personal decisions made
in the different treatments of the bargaining game. The focus group discussions reflected upon the
game bargaining situations and real-life interactions seeking to explore similarities and differences
between the bargaining process and outcomes.
There are many methodological challenges in the operationalization of theories of institutional
change. A difficult one to operationalize is the concept of power. Power is dynamic and changes over
time; it might be offset by another resource; and it is very difficult to measure [33]. In order to address
these challenges, the bargaining power here was conceptualized as an ability to survive longer without
a cooperative agreement, in other words an ability to exhibit considerable patience in bargaining.
Three analytical steps were taken to triangulate the methods (case study and bargaining experiments)
and analysis of the collected qualitative and quantitative data (Table 2).
Table 2. Methodological triangulation to explain and understand pasture use power relationships
in Kyrgyzstan.
Analytical Steps Qualitative Case Study Bargaining Experiment
First step:
Core bargaining situations and power resources
in pasture use are identified; Qualitative
evaluation of power and its dynamics
Second step:
An example of bargaining situation and
power resource are modeled in experiment
Power—the time preference is quantitatively
measured in experiment using a discount
factor; Causal relation between power and
efficiency tested
Third step: Reasons for decision making and their implications for bargaining outcome in pasture useinvestigated using statistical and qualitative content analysis methods
Source: Authors.
Scientific investigation always starts with a qualitative step. Before scientists can study
quantitatively, they must first figure out what exactly they want to study and then need to define
the scale and/or levels of measurement of the phenomena in question [34]. Thus, here core action
situations in pasture use and key power resources involved in bargaining and their dynamics were
first identified and evaluated within the framework of the qualitative case study.
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A quantitative analysis then follows in order to learn more about the selected empirical phenomena.
Knowledge gained about core bargaining situations and the main power of actors in step one was
later used to frame the experimental game. In line with the Rubinstein’s bargaining game, power
was measured in terms of the time preference of players, and quantitative data collected from the
bargaining experiments was statistically analyzed to learn about the causal relationships between
power asymmetry and the efficiency of bargaining outcomes.
The results of a quantitative analysis then were interpreted, again qualitatively. For the present
study, the experimental results were interrelated by referring to the findings from the case studies
in order to understand the reasons behind the decision-making processes of pasture users and their
implications for bargaining outcomes in pasture use.
4. Experimental Results
The efficiency of the bargaining that took place during the game, based on the mean final round
needed to achieve an agreement, is shown in Table 3, which shows that the students needed fewer
rounds to reach an agreement in the symmetric treatment (2.00) compared to the asymmetric treatment
(2.30). The pasture users, however, needed a relatively similar number of rounds to reach an agreement
in the symmetric treatment (1.90) but fewer rounds in the asymmetric treatment (1.25). We can also see
that the equilibrium achieved in the laboratory and field experiments by students and pasture users
were close to each other for both treatments.
Table 3. Mean final round and equilibrium for each treatment.
Treatment Mean Final Round and Equilibrium (Students) Mean Final Round and Equilibrium (Pasture Users)
Symmetric 2.00 rounds (44.80; 55.20) 1.90 rounds (45.77; 54.33)
Asymmetric 2.30 rounds (52.00; 48.00) 1.25 rounds (51.67; 48.33)
Source: Authors.
For analysis of the experimental results, we compared the players’ bargaining demands in the
symmetric and asymmetric treatments in order to test the assumption that they will differ due to
being affected by power asymmetry. To do this, we conducted a Kolmagorov-Smirnov two-sample
(one-tailed) test, which measures the significance of deviation between two sample sets [35] (p. 127).
Following Vollstädt [28], we assume that first round demands made by player 1 may influence the
bargaining process. Therefore, we tested their cumulative distribution function.
Table 4 and Figures 3 and 4 reveal that pastoralists and students offered more equal shares in the
first round in the symmetric than in the asymmetric treatments.
Table 4. Difference in cumulative frequency distributions of first round demands in field and
laboratory experiments.
Field: 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84
S201 (X) 0 0 2/20 0.00 13/20 2/20 3/20 0 0 0 0
S202 (X) 1/20 0 2/20 3/20 10/20 1/20 1/20 0 1/20 0 1/20
S201 (X)–S202 (X) 1/20 0 0 3/20 3/20 1/20 2/20 0 1/20 0 1/20
Lab: 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84 85–89 90–94
S101 (X) 1/10 2/10 3/10 1/10 0 1/10 1/10 0 1/10 0 1/10
S102 (X) 0 0 1/10 4/10 2/10 1/10 1/10 0 0 0 0
S101 (X)–S102 (X) 1/10 1/10 2/10 3/10 2/10 0 0 0 1/10 0 1/10
Source: Authors.
However, the results of the test also show that the deviation between the different treatments is
not significant in either the field or the laboratory:
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• In the laboratory experiment, 10 pairs of students (N = 10) had the largest discrepancy between
two series of demands KD = 4, which is not significant at the α = 0.05 level.
• In the field experiment, 20 pairs of pastoralists (N = 20) had the largest discrepancy between
two series of first round demands KD = 3, which is not significant at the α = 0.05 level.
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Consequently, we then tested the cumulative distribution function of the final round demands
(Table 5 and Figures 5 and 6) and found that the cumulative distribution function there is significant
for the students ut n t for the pastoralists:
• In the laboratory experiment, 10 pairs of students (N = 10) had the largest discrepancy between
two series of demands KD = 6, which is significant at the α = 0.05 level.
• In the field experiment, 20 pairs of pastoralists (N = 20) had the largest discrepancy between
two series of demands KD = 3, which is not significant at the α = 0.05 level.
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Table 5. Difference in cumulative frequency distributions of final round demands in field and
laboratory experiments.
Field: 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84
S201 (X) 1/20 3/20 2/20 1/20 7/20 1/20 2/20 2/20 0 0 1/20
S202 (X) 2/20 0 2/20 3/20 9/20 1/20 1/20 0 0 0 0
S201 (X)–S202 (X) 1/20 3/20 0 2/20 2/20 0 1/20 2/20 0 0 1/20
Lab: 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84
S101 (X) 0 0 1/10 1/10 7/10 1/10 0 0 0 0 0
S102 (X) 0 0 0 0 1/10 3/10 0 0 0 0 0
S101 (X)–S102 (X) 0 0 1/10 1/10 6/10 2/10 2/10 0 0 0 10
Source: Authors.
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The test results show that in the final round of the symmetric treatment significantly higher
numbers of students made equal share offers, which were then accepted. This was not the case in
the field experiment, where we found no significant difference between the final demands in the
symmetric and asymmetric treatments.
5. Discussion
The laboratory and field experiments demonstrate that power asymmetry may lead to significant
decrease in the efficiency of bargaining among students but not among pasture users. Although this
experiment has been conceived as a first exploratory step towards the investigation of how power
asymmetry affects efficiency in bargaining and was not intended to distinguish between different
settings (students versus resource users), we will analyze the findings here, going beyond typical
interpretations offered in the experimental literature on the well investigated differences between lab
and field experiments. Instead we will make an attempt to examine players’ decisions through the
lenses of shared beliefs.
The basic structure of the game may not contain sufficient information for the players, who
thus feel the need to search for additional information [36]. Therefore, incomplete information about
the preferences of players [5] and shared beliefs [37] may play an important role in their interaction.
In seeking to understand this, we first assumed that incomplete information in the asymmetric
treatment may lead to longer bargaining times and inefficient outcomes and, thus, tested this
assumption by measuring the degree of relation between the frequencies of the demands of students in
the first and second rounds with the bargaining outcomes in the symmetric and asymmetric treatments.
In the next step, we introduced an additional assumption—shared beliefs—as an explanation for why
pasture users in the field experiment were more efficient in the asymmetric treatment. In order to test
this, we analyzed the qualitative data collected by the complementary methods applied in the study,
as described in Section 3.3.2.
5.1. Why Does Power Asymmetry Reduce the Efficiency of Bargaining among Students?
A critical assumption of Rubinstein’s bargaining model is that bargainers have complete
information about each other’s preferences. But what happens if we assume that players do not
have such complete information? Rubinstein [5] (p. 99) suggests that in this situation new aspects will
appear: (a1) player 1 may try to figure out what the actual bargaining costs for player 2 are and (b1)
player 2 may cheat player 1 into thinking that he is stronger than he actually is. Bargaining under
these conditions can result in inefficient outcomes.
In order to test Rubinstein’s assumptions, we measured the degree of relation between the frequencies
of the demands of player 1 in first rounds and player 2 in second rounds with the bargaining outcomes
in the symmetric and asymmetric treatments by calculating contingency coefficient C. This test is
widely applied to measure the degree of relation between two sets of data in small samples and
has a certain freedom from assumptions and requirements. For example, it requires only nominal
measurements and does not require assumptions about the shape of population data and continuity in
the variables under analysis [35] (p. 201).
To do this test, we took the following analytical steps:
1. We arranged the observed frequencies of demands of players (Oij) and bargaining outcomes
into a 2 × 2 (r × k) contingency table and determined the expected frequencies (Eij) under null
hypothesis (H0) for each cell by multiplying the two marginal totals common to that cell and
dividing by total number of cases (Table 6).
2. We then measured the significance of the difference between player demands in two the
treatments x2 and determined the correlation expressed by contingency coefficient C by using the
following formulas [35] (p. 197):













We tested whether the measured value C indicates a relation between player demands and the
outcomes of the treatments (Sym and Asym).
The test demonstrates that
3. The relation between the frequency of player demands in first and second rounds with bargaining
outcomes has the contingency coefficient C = 0.04.
4. The significance of the difference between the player demands in the two treatments x2 = 0.6,
which means that x2 > 0.6 with degrees of freedom (df ) = (k − 1)(r− 1) = (2 − 1)(2 − 1) = 1 and
has a probability of occurrence under H0 of less than 0.90.
Thus, we conclude that there is a relation between the demands of player 1 (livestock owner) in
the first round and player 2 (herder) in the second round for the outcomes of treatments in which
participants of the lab experiment were students and that contingency coefficient C = 0.04 is different
from zero.
Table 6. Frequency of student demands related to outcomes.
Player Inefficient (Asym) Efficient (Sym) Total










Total 133 109 242
Source: Authors.
5.2. Why Does Power Asymmetry not Reduce Bargaining Efficiency among Pasture Users?
Another important question now arises: why were the pastoralists more efficient than students in
the asymmetric treatment of the bargaining game? The framed field experiment was conducted in a
more complex environment compared with the laboratory experiment, which was simpler and set in
an artificial setting. Therefore, we assume that some added factor was present during bargaining in
the more natural environment. The bargaining experiments were conducted on the summer pastures
in Jergetal and in the municipality office in Tosh Bulak. The field experiment allowed us to gain
important insights about the bargaining process and to formulate certain hypotheses to explain the
experimental results, which were then further explored using the complementary methods mentioned
above. During this stage of the research, we analyzed information from the interviews and focus
groups about how real-life negotiations take place among pasture users and about their views on
bargaining power. In this subsection, we explore whether the results of the field experiment can be
explained via the additional explanatory variable of shared beliefs [37,38] by presenting the shared
beliefs of pastures users regarding actual bargaining costs and the credibility of commitments and
discussing their role in bargaining among pasture users.
In line with Aoki [37,38] we assume that (1) pastoralists form individual beliefs and expectations
concerning how others will play and what expectations they have as well as about the potential
equilibrium of the played game; (2) even under the condition of complete information about the setting
of the game, boundedly rational players have incomplete information about the preferences of others
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and credibility of their commitments; and (3) based on this information and common experience, their
shared beliefs evolve concerning the way in which the game should be played. These beliefs are either
supported and confirmed by players’ choices during the game, or they are undermined and must be
abandoned. From the field experiment we can see that, in the asymmetric interaction, where relative
bargaining power (their breakdown values) differs, players may not have complete information and
face a challenge to answer two important questions:
(i) What are the actual bargaining costs the players have?
(ii) How credible are the commitments of other players?
Here we describe the beliefs pasture users have about real-life bargaining interactions, which may
help them to economize on information and answer the questions posed above, which they may
have faced during the field experiment. During real-life interactions community herders and
livestock owners pool their livestock and cooperate in the use of common pastures. Their interaction
is repeated every year and represents a mixed-motive cooperative game, where both players
oppose non-cooperation and prefer cooperation though they may disagree about alternative
cooperation outcomes.
Regarding the shared beliefs of pasture users about actual bargaining costs, it must be kept in
mind that these actors are strongly interdependent in their real-life bargaining interactions. They have
different cooperation payoffs, but the non-cooperation costs are also high for both sides. Pasture users
have experienced dynamic changes in their power relations due to changing economic conditions.
Initially, increased livestock value and numbers raised the demand for herder’s services, which has
consequently stimulated an increase of community herders offering such services. Thus, community
herders first increased their bargaining power, as they had lower exit costs compared to the livestock
owners who were dependent on herder’s services. The situation has changed recently however, as the
greater amount of herders offering their services has resulted in livestock owners becoming stronger
during bargaining.
Shared beliefs concerning the credibility of commitment of community herders in real-life bargaining
interactions depend very much on their reputation. Their interaction with livestock owners is repeated
every year, and the latter would not usually entrust their animals to a community herder who had
not taken good care of his livestock in the previous year. A herder’s credibility is also dependent on
experience and knowledge about the pastoral system and livestock management, which can increase
herder bargaining power in negotiations with livestock owners. Thus, experienced herders may get
better payment offers compared to their inexperienced colleagues.
Based on the above considerations, we suggest the following interpretation of the experimental
results from the bargaining experiment (Table 7): First, incomplete information in the asymmetric
treatment may have caused longer bargaining (inefficient outcome) because (a1) player 1 (livestock
owner) may have tried to figure out what the actual bargaining costs for player 2 (herder) are and
(b1) player 2 may have tried to cheat player 1 into thinking that she was stronger than she actually
was. Second, as a result, the players were confronted during the game with questions regarding
issues such as (a2) what the actual bargaining costs of the other players were and (b2) how credible the
commitments of the other players were. Third, the pasture users had shared beliefs about expectations
they already had in real-life interactions. These shared beliefs have been gradually developed on
the basis of their interaction history and experiences and as observed, ultimately influenced their
decisions during the experiment. Thus, (a3) there was a strong interdependence between pasture users,
as bargaining costs are high for both actors, and (b3) the credibility of commitment, which is the main
bargaining power, depended very much on the reputation and experience of the community herder.
The pasture users internalized the game because their shared beliefs helped them to economize on
information and be more efficient in their bargaining.
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Table 7. Shared beliefs help to economize on information.
1. Incomplete Information 2. Important Questions thePlayers Face
3. Shared Beliefs Help to Economize
on Information
(a1) Player 1 (livestock owner) may try
to figure out what the actual
bargaining costs for player 2 are;
(a2) What are the actual bargaining
costs the community herder and
livestock owner actually have?
(a3) High interdependence between
the livestock owner and community
herder, as bargaining costs are high
for both actors involved
(b1) Player 2 (herder) may cheat
player 1 into believing that he is
stronger than he actually is;
(b2) How credible is the
commitment of the herder?
(b3) The credibility of commitment,
which is the main bargaining power,
depends very much on the reputation
and experience of community herders.
Source: Authors.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the role of power and efficiency in institutional change in
pasture use in Kyrgyzstan by exploring how the set of the conditions (here, power asymmetry),
in which bargaining takes place, affects the outcomes of interaction (efficiency). To explore these issues,
we conducted laboratory and framed field bargaining experiments based on Rubinstein’s [5] bargaining
game, complemented by additional qualitative methods (questionnaires, group discussions and
interviews) in order to enhance the analysis of the broader socio-ecological context. The experimental
results confirm the findings reported in the literature that as players in bargaining experiments learn
about the game they are playing and the behavior of others, they adjust their behavior accordingly;
they are also concerned not only about their own payoffs but those of others too, so there is a prevalence
of equal division as an outcome [27].
The paper has sought to explore whether power asymmetry leads to inefficient bargaining
outcomes. While students had difficulties in coordinating their cooperation in the asymmetric game,
pasture users were generally more efficient. The study formulates certain hypotheses to explain the
experimental results by suggesting that, even under the condition of complete information about the
setting of the game, the boundedly rational players have nevertheless incomplete information about
the preferences and the commitments’ credibility of other players, and tend to internalize the game as
a group. In such a case, the shared beliefs of pasture users might have helped them to economize on
information processing and coordinate their bargaining.
Incomplete information about the preferences of others in the asymmetric treatment may lead to
longer bargaining (inefficient outcomes) because (a1) player 1 may try to figure out what the actual
bargaining costs for player 2 are and (b1) player 2 may try to cheat player 1 into thinking that he
is stronger than he actually is. As a result, the players will search for additional information about
(a2), the actual bargaining costs the players have, and (b2), the credibility of the commitments of
other players. The pasture users who were taking part in the field experiment had shared beliefs about
expectations they already held in real-life interactions about (a3) the high interdependence between
pasture users and (b3) the importance of a herder’s reputation. They thus internalized these beliefs
into the experimental game, which actually allowed them to economize on information and be more
efficient in their bargaining.
This interpretation of the experimental findings supports both the arguments of Knight and
Williamson about the impact of sets of conditions in social interactions. In the asymmetric interactions,
where breakdown values are different, power may play a greater role, leading to an inefficient outcome.
On the other hand, actors involved in an asymmetric interaction may also achieve an efficient outcome
under the condition that they can negotiate it “in a relatively farsighted way”—in the sense that
they can look toward the future and recognize potential hazards and transaction costs ex ante their
agreement [25] (p. 23).
The study contributes to the literature comparing students and resource users in experimental
games by providing valuable insights about the dynamics of the bargaining process and the role of
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power and efficiency therein, but some limitations of the study should be recognized as well. Similarly
to observations made by Cárdenas and Ostrom [36], bringing the experimental laboratory into the
field proved to be a challenging task. The research we have presented here has a largely exploratory
character, with planned initially small research steps to test the impact of power on the efficiency in
bargaining in symmetric and asymmetric sets of conditions. The explanatory variable shared beliefs was
not included in the initial design of the experiment nor tested experimentally. Moreover, we did not
analyze individual beliefs of the players with additional methods. For future studies, this suggests
the need to specifically address the formation and changing character of players’ individual and
shared beliefs in bargaining and experimentally test these important variables by including them in an
experimental design.
The paper offers some methodological insights concerning the use of experiments in the study
of power concepts in dynamic contexts of changing power balances over time. The qualitative
methods employed, admittedly underplayed in this paper, enabled the authors to understand the
institutional context and the reasons actors may have to change institutions. That understanding
was later tested in the laboratory and framed field experiments, revealing their value but also their
limitations. In experimentally studying power relations in pasture use, critical dimensions of core
bargaining situations regarding power (for example credibility of commitment, exit costs and time
preferences) are revealed and can increase the explanatory power of qualitative findings.
Last but not least, and in a wider policy relevant effort, the paper seeks to contribute to the
discourse among practitioners about designing and implementing agricultural reforms and especially
introducing pastoral institutions. Therefore, the paper explores the process of institutional change in
relation to change of bargaining power and distributional consequences, followed by a first attempt
to acknowledge the role of the beliefs of actors in the learning process which Kyrgyz policy makers
and pasture users go through due to recent reforms in the legislation. Although such an analysis
goes beyond the scope of the present paper, the investigated core action situations in Jergetal and
Tosh Bulak communities where pasture users negotiate and interact in pasture use demonstrates
the high interdependence amongst actors. It further highlights that herder and livestock owners are
involved in a continuous dynamic process of bargaining. Although this process engages different
actors at local, regional and national level, in this paper we focused on the bargaining process between
herders and owners, comparing their decisions with those of students. We have observed a change of
power asymmetries strongly influenced by dynamics of economic conditions and enforcement of new
formal institutions and governance structures, but we have also explored the role of time dimension
in shaping power relations. The latter was manifested through the time preferences actors have,
and in the development of shared beliefs in dealing with power asymmetries and the effectiveness
of bargaining outcomes. Such lessons can be further picked up by Pasture Committees and policy
makers, in an attempt to better understand actors’ interactions, commit to a better-informed process of
institutional design and advocate the need for intended institutional change taking into consideration
local specificities.
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